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THE DECLINE OF MILITARY LITERATURE
by

DONALD ATWELL ZOLL

(Editor's Note: In June of 1971, Professor
Donald Atwell Zoll o f the Department o f
Political Science, Arizona State University,
attended the National Strategy Seminar at the
Army War College. He was sent a copy o f the
Spring/Summer issue o f Parameters, and on 1
November 1972 he wrote to the editor to say
that after examining the Journal he was
prompted to pen a brief article entitled "The
Decline of Military Literature," and he
submitted it for consideration for publication
in Parameters. The article that follows is the
one he submitted for consideration. It takes
issue w i t h the paucity o f military
commentary and contains a number o f
interesting challenges to the military
professional, not the least o f which is that he
start to write about the problems that are
pertinent to his profession in order to
preempt the civilian in academic circles who is
producing quasi-military works. Professor Zoll
cites six factors that account for this decline
and he hopes his insights will contribute to a
revival o f what he calls "military literature. "
It is hoped that his article will stimulate our
readers to meet his challenge head on, and

write. Our address is on the inside o f the front
cover.)

It is notable that the Indo-China War, a
struggle featuring ubiquitous tactical and
strategic subtleties, provoked no vast body of
critical military literature. This is surprising
not only for the reason that the Vietnam
conflict would seem, all else being equal,
particularly appropriate a subject for
sophisticated military commentary, but also
for the reason that other military operations
conducted by the United States and other
powers have invariably stimulated such
professional interpretation. This paucity of
military commentary is made more
provocative yet by a collateral observation
that since the initial introduction of nuclear
weaponry there has been comparatively little
speculative military literature beyond the two
areas of technological discussion and
quasi-political exposition.
It would seem that the era of the military
critic-in a somewhat similar genre to the
literary critic-has passed. The post-World War
I I period has produced no figures comparable
to the nineteenth-century theorists like
Clausewitz, Jomini and Delbruck or the
twentieth-century commentators of the type
represented by Reppington, Liddell Hart and
Baldwin. Even World War I I did not appear to
trigger as fulsome a torrent of military
criticism as might be imagined, although the
historical coverage of this conflict has been
extensive and competent. True, we have had
generals' memoirs (some of which, like Von
Manstein's, deserve the attention of the
military scholar) and works essentially in the
milieu of grand strategy, but, curiously, most
of the classics of modern military exposition
were penned in the period between the wars,

ticles and reviews

M o d e r n Age and The
Intercollegiate Review. He is

Director of The Robert A.
Taft Institute of Government
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such as those of Fuller, Liddell Hart and the
air power theorists. Indeed, one can see a
decline in serious military commentary among
the professional soldiery, as well as a
tendency in civilian academic circles to
p r o d u c e quasi- military works, either
predominantly political or technological.
CAUSES

On broad reflection, it is possible to
speculate on the causes for the decline of
military literature in general and upon the
p a r t i c u l a r d i m i n i s h m e n t of military
commentary in the case of comparatively

".. . ONE

CAN SEE A DECLINE
I N SERIOUS MILITARY
COMMENTARY AMONG THE
PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERY, AS
WELL AS A TENDENCY I N
CIVILIAN ACADEMIC CIRCLES
TO PRODUCE QUASI-MILITARY
WORKS.

Karl von Clausewitz

. . ."

relationships between military establishments
and military observers and commentators.
(1) There are subtle indications that there
is a lowered intellectual level in regard to
intra-service military speculation and its
attendant literature in most western armies.
T o some degree this has resulted from a
broadened social and educational base from
which officer recruitment is inaugurated.
Evident, too, is a deepening suspicion of the
"general staff" mentality, which, granted its
limitations, did infuse into armies a distinct
intellectualistic cast. The undeniable
"bureaucratization" of most western military
establishments had led to greater emphasis
upon the skills of "management" and
"leadership" or technological competency
and to decline in more academic attitudes to
the art of war. In this sense, Max Weber's
predictions have held true for military as well
as civilian bureaucracies. It is very clear, if one
examines the casual literary efforts of military
officers of the current period, that the

recent operations in Korea and Indo-China.
One might suggest the following factors in
accounting for this decline: ( 1 ) a lowered
intellectual vitality in speculations about the
art of war; (2) a feeling of the diminishing
significance of the craft of war in view of the
advent of highly sophisticated technological
weaponry; (3) a preoccupation with political
as against purely military problems and an
assumption that the two considerations are
invariably inseparable; (4) an increased
hostility against military activities by the
general public and a lack of rapport and
u n d e r s t a n d i n g between the academic
community and the professional military;
(5) changes in military education; (6) the
inclination of some military bureaucracies to
be suspicious of non-service military critics
(however sympathetic in general viewpoint)
and to introduce canons of secrecy in regard
to military affairs uncustomary in previous
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thematic materials they choose to deal with
m i r r o r this emphasis: political-military
r e l a t i o n s h i p s , human management,
technological innovation and problems of
procurement. In any case, bureaucracy, as a
social phenomenon, tends to discourage
theoretical speculation and it is doubtful
whether a young De Gaulle would have
contemporaneously penned his well-known
treatise on armored warfare.
(2) There is a widely held view that the
advent of electronic-nuclear devices have
eliminated many of the classical concerns of
the arts of war. Judgment may still be
important and leadership and organization
and logistical skills, but "generalship," if that
term may serve, is seen as vaguely archaic.
Such an outlook obviously discourages
military commentary. But the attitude is itself
fallacious on a number of counts. In the first
place, the military operations since the dawn
of the nuclear age have not been trials of arms
decided by the superiorities in sophisticated
weaponry. Indeed, overwhelmingly they have
been atavistic struggles, in a historical sense,

"A SPRITELY CONTINUITY OF
MILITARY CRITICISM WOULD
HAVE BEEN AND WOULD BE
D I S T I N C T L Y USEFUL I N
RENDERING MILITARY
THINKING MORE RESPONSIVE
AND EFFICACIOUS."

Antoine Henri Jomini
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placing great emphasis upon the most
rudimentary and perennial problems of
tactical and strategic thought. They have also
taxed heavily what may be called the military
imagination-and that military imagination
has, in most instances, been found wanting.
Without attempting an extended critique of
military operation since Korea, it is apparent
to the unprejudiced observer that events have
tended to spawn improvisational solutions,
solutions of a tactical and strategic nature
that could have well profitted from a more
theoretical and even academic grasp of the
elements of military art, historically evolved.
A spritely continuity of military criticism
would have been and would be distinctly
useful in rendering military thinking more
responsive and efficacious. We were
benumbed, intellectually, by the formidable
aspect of our immense weapon power, but
such a derogation of the military intellect
proved a marked liability in our ability to
cope with the realities of our military
commitments. If anyone harbors any doubts
as to the human and intellectual factor in the
conduct of war, one only need scrutinize the
"Six-Day War" between Israel and the United
Arab Republic.
(3) Military thinking in the postwar era
was extensively "politicalized," doubtless
adhering to Clausewitz's famous dictum
regarding war as an extension of policy. There
is, of course, much truth in the Clausewitzian
precept, but it does not cancel out a viable
division of labor between political planning
and military planning. If war is an instrument
for the attainment of broader political
objectives, the efficacy of that instrument
turns on matters predominantly military in
nature. There has been an alarming fashion

among some military careerists-in a number
of western armies-to become, in fact,
students of politics to the exclusion of
concern for military crafts, particularly the
syphoning off of the best military minds into
areas of political preoccupation. It may be
desirable, o n e would grant, for a
contemporary general (akin to Gilbert and
Sullivan's "modern major general") to be
well-versed in a number of areas, including the
political. One would see no reason why a
general might not also hold a Ph.D. degree in
political science, provided that his central
calling, as he would envision it, would be the
science of arms. It is vital for the
contemporary soldier to be politically
sophisticated, but he must be so in order to
practice his profession in a superior fashion.
Thus, he ought to be a better military critic
than a political one.
The military art is not to be despised. It
may be secondary to the political in a grand
strategic sense, but this does not mean that it
need be an inferior intellectual preoccupation.
Politics, in any case, may determine the
context of the soldier's activity, but it cannot
instruct him significantly as to the character
of that activity in its more
specific
applications. The hyper-political orientation
of some contemporary military theorists has
led them to the questionable assumption that
the operations of politics can be directly
applied, mutatis mutandis, to the realm of
military activity. History offers a sharp
rebuttal.
( 4 ) Prospective military writers and
theorists-both in service and in the civilian
ranks-suffer, currently, from a culturally
induced inferiority complex. The pernicious
implication that professional military activity
is somehow a socially reprehensible business is
amplified in the case of serious-minded
military writing and criticism-so presumably
cynical, amoral and cold-blooded. That this is
errant sentimentality is beside the point, but
it is notable that major newspaper chains no
l o n g e r boast of having " military
correspondents," although the gallant S.L.A.
Marshall continues to buck the tide. Even
career officers feel this taint in regard to
wholly military discussion and tend to infuse
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it w i t h a s o r t of politically-derived
euphemistic rhetoric.
Also, the professional military no longer
trusts, by and large, the civilian academic
community which yet contains many
intellectuals interested and concerned with
military affairs, not only from a sociological
point of view, but also from the stance of
military history and art. This attitude on the
part of the military establishments is quite
understandable-they have been the targets of
much quasi-intellectual abuse or have been
often the victims of ill-advised civilian
"consultants" who were in the vanguard of
the bureaucratization of the armed services.
But in many instances, the professional
military is too suspicious and does not fully
appreciate the intellectual stimulation to be
gained by contact with sympathetic civilian
theorists. Many civilian observers know more
about the current travail of the military than
many officers appreciate and, too, in some
instances, possess competencies regarding the
intellectual aspects of the arts of war that are
highly useful, especially in a critical way. A
renaissance of military literature involves
healing this lamentable breech. It also requires

Liddell Hart

jettisoning of the feeling that military science
is a blighted business, unfit for superior
minds. Tell that, indeed, to a Turenne or a
Frederick the Great.
(5) Military literature is, after all, the
indirect product of a military education.
Education cannot remain static or, indeed,
stagnant. But military education in most
western armies is in dire need of some
reforms. Two principal areas are indicated:
(a) reduction of the reliance upon civilian
institutions of learning in the educating of
officers and (b) restoration to the curriculum
of the service schools of a systematic
emphasis upon military art, history and
doctrine. Civilian universities are far from
ideal places to carry on the further education
of officers, especially those eventually to be
seconded to important command function. It
is, by and large, an alien environment, it
heightens feelings of "inferiority" regarding
the intellectual respectability of military art
and it infuses an excessively political outlook.
Military establishments would be well-advised
to undertake military higher education
themselves and if this involves a return to the
"general staff" concept, so be it. It is far
better to introduce the best civilian minds
into military-operated institutions of learning
than to "farm out" potential military leaders
to civilian institutions whose concerns are, in
general, quite remote from the trade of the
soldier. This is not said, of course, to
deprecate universities (one of which the
author serves), but to suggest that the
integrity of military art as an intellectual
undertaking is seriously jeopardized by
e x t e n d e d e x p o s u r e t o influences
professionally isolated from this concern.
But the service schools themselves have a
responsibility that goes beyond either a
facsimile of civilian education and an
indoctrination of necessary skills. The
military college-or its equivalent-has a very
special educational role, dictated, of course,
by the nature of the profession it serves, not
unlike colleges of medicine or law. Indeed, no
college of law or medicine would relegate
jurisprudence or physical pathology to a
secondary role in its curriculum and a military
college cannot do so either, particularly if it

S. L. A. Marshall, Brig. Gen., USAR (Ret)

takes seriously, which it does, the challenge of
protecting the state by the training of
superior military minds.
( 6 ) A l a m e n t a b l e feature of the
" politicalization" of s o m e military
establishments in the West has been to adopt
an excesssively defensive posture in regard to
its relationships with other organs of
government and, indeed, to the general
public. The sources of this defensive attitude
are not hard to find and certainly the military
establishment feels the sting of hostility
within the complex of the society. It quite
understandably desires to cloak itself from
irrational and prejudiced criticism and it has,
of course, certain ideal means of doing so. But
it might keep two thoughts in mind: (a) such
a posture, used indiscriminately, discourages
genuine and enlightened military criticism and
(b) it is one thing to protect the integrity of
information and yet another to make it
difficult for the military critic to evaluate
performance, a role which the military critic
has justifiably undertaken in the modern
period and which, generally speaking, has
p r o v e n beneficial t o t h e military
establishment overall, even if it has damaged a
few private reputations.
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wholly responsible for the paralysis of
military writing-all contribute in varying
degrees. Moreover, military literature has not
disappeared altogether, but only diminished
in scope and quantity. The complexities of
military problems yet before us and likely to
be confronted strongly suggest not the
obsolescence of writing on military art, but an
increasing need for the practice of this talent.
The need is as much psychological, perhaps,
" T H E COMPLEXITIES O F
M I L I T A R Y PROBLEMS..
STRONGLY SUGGEST.. . A N
INCREASING NEED FOR THE
PRACTICE O F . . (WRITING)."

.

.

as theoretical. It is discouraging (to this writer
anyway) when one talks with otherwise
highly intelligent officers today who have not
the foggiest notion of what Hannibal did at
Cannae o r why Gustavus Adlophus
overturned the military system of the Empire
and the advantages of the battalion carre.
What is discouraging is not simply a lack of
specific historical information-what is
discouraging is that it indicates the fact that
the officer does not subjectively place himself
w i t h i n t h e altogether honorable and
significant continuity of his chosen
profession. How, indeed, can a lawyer really
revere his profession who knows nothing of
Coke, Blackstone and Holmes? How can a
soldier cherish his calling without an
identification with Marlborough, Frederick,
Grant and Lee? When he realizes the
worth-and contemporary significance-of
this tradition, then he will turn to it and turn
his pen to it and zealously join those in and
out of the service who share this common
intellectual concern. This awareness will do
more than anything else to remedy the
conditions that retard a revival of military
literature.
Bl

Hanson Baldwin

Perfection is an illusive condition. No
reasonable man expects perfection in the
application of the military arts. The general
does not live-or ever has lived-who has not
made a mistake. Great generals are, by the
way, those who had wit enough to learn from
their mistakes. No people can legitimately
demand only victories or that every soldier be
a credit to the uniform he wears. The military
life is based upon reasonable standards, well
understood by students of the history of
warfare. Military establishments in the present
age suffer from hypersensitivity; they often
do not accord to their critics a knowledge of
what are the reasonable standards of
j u d g m e n t . Thus, military literature,
contemporaneously, declines to the extent
that this hypersensitivity prevails and the
military seems to ask for a finally impossible
immunity.
CONCLUSION

No one of the factors described above is
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